

二十世紀前半葉印尼伊斯蘭的發展： 宗教—政治的論述

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摘 要

本論文主旨在解析二十世紀前半葉間，印尼伊斯蘭發展歷史過程，其國外與國內影響因素的交互關係。本論文著重於在此期間（含括荷蘭殖民的最後階段、日本短暫的佔領，以及印尼獨立建國初期），因為民族主義情緒的興起，以及轉入獨立狀態下印尼伊斯蘭的變化發展。在此前提下論證此國內、外突出因素的交互作用影響了印尼伊斯蘭發展特色。蘇維埃共產主義政策、泛伊斯蘭主義議題、日本短暫殖民期的政策等因素被認知為造成印尼伊斯蘭大大改變的因素；相對地，這些因素也形塑了伊斯蘭在今日印尼社會中的重大影響力。

關鍵詞：印尼、伊斯蘭、泛伊斯蘭主義、殖民主義、日本

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The Development of Indonesian Islam during the First Half of the Twentieth Century: a Politico-Religious Discourse

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Abstract

This article discusses the interaction between foreign and domestic influences on the development of Indonesian Islam during the first half of the 20th century. It focuses on Indonesian Islam during the period of the rise of nationalist sentiment and the transition to independence — encompassing the final decades of Dutch colonization, the brief Japanese occupation, and the early years of the Indonesian Republic. This essay argues that this distinct interplay between foreign and domestic influences shaped the unique flavour of Indonesian Islam. The influences of communist Soviet policies, the issue of Pan-Islamism, and Japanese policies during the occupation period in the development of Islam are identified as factors responsible for profound changes in Indonesian Islam and its great influence on Indonesian society today.

Keywords: Indonesia, Islam, Pan-Islamism, Colonialism, Japan

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Introduction

The contemporary modern state of Indonesia is the result of Indonesia in the past having gone down a long road filled with various political, social and economic challenges. The country is so diverse that it is almost impossible to gauge the totality of the influences and challenges that have contributed in shaping the present Indonesian state. However, what clear is the enormous significance of the role of Islam over the centuries, and for the vast majority of Indonesians today. As Indonesia was still under colonial control for most of the first half of the 20th century, opposition between colonized Indonesians and the foreign colonial government created a specific environment that influenced the way Indonesian Islam grew.

This paper weighs the importance of both external foreign influences as well as internal domestic developments of Indonesian Islam in the era of colonial rule. This paper also argues that foreign developments combined with internal Indonesian societal dynamics have contributed to the distinct flavor and characteristic resilience of Indonesian Islam in the independent Indonesian Republic today. These international and national factors were both influential in the development of Indonesian Islam into as Indonesian political force today. Therefore, an unraveling of their interplay reveals the factors driving the development of Islam in Indonesia. What exactly were the specific international issues that triggered an interaction with the outside politicized members of the Islamic Ummah (community) which was also struggling against colonialism.

Historical-situational Context

Islam as Oppositional Force against the Dutch Colonial Administration

In the 19th century numerous popular uprisings that occurred in the Netherlands-Indies against the colonial rule and the exploitation of the society had genuine economic grievances expressed by Islamic undertones.¹ Islam was after all the major factor in society that appealed to ordinary people. Evoking Islam helped to motivate and bring peoples of differing ethnicities and regions together against the foreign oppressors. The local elites were of course very aware of this power and in the Diponegoro Rebellion (1825-1830) Prince Diponegoro relied on the key elements of traditional belief systems, legitimacy of the indigenous ruler and pious Islam.² The Diponegoro Rebellion failed however and historically it became the last major challenge to Dutch authority on Java. Dutch colonialism would itself collapse with the arrival of the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) during World War II. The subsequent four years would see the Indonesian revolution ushering Indonesia into the era of independence.

For the more than 100 years of Dutch rule after the Diponegoro Rebellion on Java, it is hard to quantify to what degree Dutch administrative efficiency and expert policy making accounted. Once such policy expert was Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), a very important Islamic scholar with sharp insight gained both through field experiences and theoretical study. He entered the Dutch Civil Service in the Netherlands-Indies, and the colonial timeframe in which he was born naturally colored his views and theories. Hurgronje acted as an advisor during the Aceh conflict in the Netherlands-Indies where the Dutch had tremendous difficulty in conquering the region. While a more in-depth discussion of the different cases of conflict and administration in Java and Aceh during the 19th century falls outside of the scope of this essay, the Aceh case seems to certain degree more similar to places like Patani in Thailand and Sulu in the Philippines where indigenous political Islam-based power holders managed to transition to modernity in the rift that opened up between the colliding spheres of influences of two major colonial powers. The

¹ For specific research on rebellions in Java see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888* (Leiden: Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, 1966).

² On the whole dynamics of Diponegoro see for instance Peter B. R. Carey, *The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).

Mataram Empire in Java could clearly not benefit from such a situation as it fell squarely within the region dominated exclusively by the Dutch colonial administration.

Indonesian Islam as part of Broader Anti-Colonial Political Activity and the Desire for a Modern Nation-State

At the turn of the 20th century, the anti-colonial attitude that grew in the economic development of the Netherlands-Indies became increasingly widespread. The indigenous communities were largely left behind and their responses were inspired by differing ideological perspectives. In response to the lack of social development, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah in 1912 and introduced new Islamic teaching approaches intending to modernize Indonesian Islam. The Muhammadiyah organization stayed out of politics to avoid conflicts with the colonial government. Muhammadiyah was inspired by the Egyptian Grand Mufti Shaikh Mohammad Abduh and was based socially, religiously and educationally in Islam.³ This desired to strive for a modern society that developed in Indonesia was contemporaneous to what other figures and organizations were striving for internationally. Communism and nationalism were ideologies that also inspired Indonesians. At times these different philosophies were absorbed simultaneously by organizations and individuals. One example is Semaoen who inspired by both Islam and communism began his political activism in Sarekat Islam and later became a communist leader.

Yet there were distinct differences between the ideologies and groups that would start to become more and more pronounced in the course of the 20th century. In his study of Muhammadiyah in Kota Gedeh in Yogyakarta, Mitsuo Nakamura describes some of the village level contradictions in the 1920s to the local Indonesian Communist Party of the time. While also being anti-colonial, Muhammadiyah would not get involved in anti-government action as it claimed “individual religious enlightenment as its primary task”.⁴

³ Alexandre von Arx, *L'évolution Politique en Indonésie de 1900 à 1942* (Fribourg: Artigianelli-Monza, 1949), p. 168.

⁴ Mitsuo Namamura, *The Crescent arises over the Banyan Tree* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1993), p. 65.

The other major organization of Islamic mobilization, Sarekat Islam under the guidance of Tjokroaminoto since 1912, started out with the goal to promote intellectual and material development and religious life including through opposing false concepts of Islam.⁵ Contrary to Muhammadiyah however, Sarekat Islam focused increasingly more on nationalist issues in the political sphere than social issues.⁶ In 1932, Semaoen on a visit to Tajikistan that was part of the Soviet Union, explained the impressive development of that country by emphasizing the Soviet policies of development and education of the indigenous people in contrast to the Netherlands-Indies where colonial education policies left the large majority of Indonesians illiterate.⁷

Finally, similar anti-colonialist awareness and desire for a modern nation can be seen in the political activist Indonesians who were inspired by nationalism. Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo together with the Eurasian E. F. E. Douwes Dekker in 1912 formed the National Indies Party (Nationale Indische Partij). This political group argued for the first time for an independent *Indies* (Indonesian) homeland but they were immediately outlawed by the colonial government.⁸ The political movements that gradually emerged in the early 20th century all shared the motivation to empower and educate the Indonesian common people left out by the modernizing colonial state. Islam directly or indirectly influenced all of these political movements, because there was a large number of active Indonesian Muslims in them, as well as the large Muslim audience responsive to Islamic discourse made accessible through the social activities of Islamic organizations such as Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah. Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah had pioneered the social Islamic movements of the early decades of the 20th century, they were joined later by Nahdlatul Ulama founded in 1926.

Islamic Demographics as Predominant Religion

⁵ Alexandre von Arx, *L'évolution Politique en Indonésie de 1900 à 1942*, p. 168.

⁶ Alexandre von Arx, *L'évolution Politique en Indonésie de 1900 à 1942*, p. 177.

⁷ Semaoen, *Een bruin volk dat zich bevrijdt* (Amsterdam: Agentschap "Amstel", 1937), p. 17.

⁸ J. H. François, *37 Jaar Indonesische vrijheidsbeweging* (Amsterdam: De Driehoek, 1947), p. 10.

Although Indonesia consists of thousands of islands, up to the present time the majority of her populations live in Java. In the past Javanese predominance was even more obvious. Most reliable records can be found in the Dutch Census of 1930, which gives figures of 40.9 million indigenous inhabitants residing on Java and Madura (7% of the total land area of the Netherlands Indies) and mere 18.2 million indigenous inhabitants for the remaining islands of the Netherlands Indies.⁹ This is the earliest source of systematic population data from the area, and prior to this only estimates are available.

The 1930 Census offers more insight. It clearly points out that in Java almost 90% of the population was rurally based.¹⁰ This explains the focus of Indonesian political activists in the peasant and rural population. Java was very important, although it was relatively small in size, but contained a very large population. This situation had not changed much in the 1940s when the Japanese entered Indonesia. Japanese estimates of population density for the island of Java reached the staggering figure of 315 people per square kilometer.¹¹ The Islamic political movement was clearly based on socio-economic popular power, and this requires a population base to mobilize and recruit from. Java, with its high population density and predominantly Muslim rural population, was a fertile environment within which Islamic organizations could grow and thrive.

The development of Islam in Sumatra in particular merits detailed study as the interaction there between Sumatra and Malaya was very important. In exploring the ability to mobilize people, it seems important however to note that Java was and still is the center of population density and of popular power. According to an estimate made during World War II, two millions of the 70 million indigenous people were Christian (0.5 million from Sumatra and 0.5 million from Sulawesi) leaving an overwhelming majority (90%) of the Netherlands-Indies indigenous population to be nominally Muslims with another 5%

⁹ M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981), p. 187.

¹⁰ Volkstelling 1930, *Inheemsche Bevolking van Midden-Java en de Vorstenlanden*, p. 5.

¹¹ Gunseikanbu, *Jawa Nengan*, 202 as cited in Frank Dhont, "Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II" (PhD thesis, Yale University, New Haven, 2012), p. 25.

classified as animists.¹² This hard data is important as it provides insight in the realm where political power was operated for the various peoples in Indonesia. Researches for instance on the regions of Surakarta and Yogyakarta during the Japanese Occupation show that during the war the Japanese military administration estimated that 68% of Surakarta's society adhered to what the Japanese termed a 'Buddhist-Muslim syncretism', while 30% was seen as Muslims.¹³ This shows that as late as the 1940s religious understanding was actually of a very low level for the general masses. This finding combined with the low level of education that the Dutch provided in Indonesia would suggest that the common Indonesians would not have paid much attention to the political developments of outside world. This is compounded by the vast distance between regions in the archipelago and low population density of the outer islands. An additional complicating factor for the operation of Islamic organizations in Indonesia at the time was also the fact that the administrative and political realm in the Netherlands Indies was concentrated on Java where the Dutch policies were more deeply embedded and education facilities were superior. These factors point out the clear Javanese predominance on the political stage, and they therefore form the main issues of discussion in this paper.

Dutch Colonial Control and the Growth of Indonesian Islam

The Netherlands was always keenly aware that Islam has been the power of social and political motivation force in their colony on the other side of the globe. In 1886, Hurgronje wrote in a Netherlands-Indies newspaper that Islam did not allow for rebellion if Muslim people had no chance to win against the oppressing power, and also that the danger of mobilization of the masses came from those undereducated groups of society

¹² Raymond Kennedy, *Islands and Peoples of the Indies* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1943), p. 54.

¹³ Gunseikanbu, *Jawa Nengan* (Jakarta: Jawa Shinbun Kai, 1944) reprinted by (Tokyo: Biblio, 1973), p. 203.

prone to act based on some Islam-rooted ideas.¹⁴ This conclusion could have come out of an intelligence report written recently, rather these observations were dated in the 19th century. The doctrines of Islam as a common identity marker in mobilizing and galvanizing mass activities was recognized at the time, because of the importance of local scholarship and education as antidotes to political propaganda. Islam could galvanize but also relied on educated practitioners to see through attempts at political manipulation.

The Years to the End of World War I

In 1915 Snouck Hurgronje published his work *Nederland en de Islam* (Netherlands and Islam), he noted that “Germany has just begun to make Mohammedan fanaticism subject to its interests.”¹⁵ At the end of the 19th century, Hurgronje had pointed out the fact that Javanese who studied in Cairo would automatically come in touch with other Islamic students because there were Javanese and Malays in Mecca and Cairo pursuing Islamic studies.¹⁶ The focal point of Islamic thought that would later influence Indonesian Islam from the outside was rooted there. There, Indonesians regularly met with Islamic students from other parts of the Muslim world, and they came into contact with ideas that would be transmitted back to Indonesia.

The Ottoman Empire allied with Germany in World War I, and the Germans fought against the British. The British in turn supported the Arabs in their rebellion against the Ottoman Turks. Hurgronje observed how Germany exploited the Islamic ideas of the ‘Caliphate’ and ‘Holy War’.¹⁷ He went on to argue that Pan-Islamism would not bring Islam back to a position of world power, and it was rather criminal to stimulate fanaticism as this could cause local turmoil for Muslim countries.¹⁸ In the Netherlands-Indies during the first few decades of the 20th century the political potential of Islam was only just to be discovered by local Indonesian politicians.

¹⁴ *De Java-Bode*, 17-11-1886, p. 6.

¹⁵ C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1915), p. IX.

¹⁶ *De Standaard*, 26-09-1883, p. 1.

¹⁷ C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam*, pp. X-XI.

¹⁸ C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam*, pp. X-XI.

A very close view of how the early conception of *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union) came into being was provided by another Dutch civil servant Petrus-Blumberger at the time. His very detailed report showed that ***Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah*** (Islamic Commercial Union) began in 1909 in Batavia under the impetus of Raden Mas Tirtoadisoerjo who was originally from Solo, but later became active in Bandung in the publication business and trade.¹⁹ At that time the movement was evaluated as a reaction against *Adat* (customary law) and an expression of indigenous conation to modernize social traditions.²⁰ Raden Mas Tirtoadisoerjo formed *Sarekat Dagang Islam* in *Buitenzorg* (Bogor) in 1911 before moving to Surakarta where he worked together with the industrial batik trader M. Hadji Samanhoedi in Lawejan.²¹ There the Sarekat (Dagang) Islam was created, and later gained its prominence.

The influence of foreign propaganda on Indonesian Islam at that time was limited. There was some economic competition from Chinese Indonesian traders, sparked reaction from an Islam-affiliated group. Originally the movement seemed not to be embedded with great Islamic fervor. The group did attack Chinese merchants and appealed to the indigenous traders and indigenous people. During World War I the Netherlands and thereafter also the Netherlands-Indies were neutral, but the United Kingdom was ruler over many Muslim countries in Africa, India, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. These were important targets for Germany. Snouck Hurgronje however evaluated this German propaganda and regarded the danger of Pan-Islamism had no threat to Dutch control in the Netherlands-Indies simply because most of the masses were not susceptible to the concept and the majority of the higher strata of society in the Netherlands-Indies would not fall for these attempts at all because education and freedom of religion had provided strong antidotes to the propaganda.²² The Netherlands-Indies were aware of the power of Islam as motivator for the masses, but it was never considered to be a serious threat to their

¹⁹ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1987), p. 56.

²⁰ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, pp. 55-56.

²¹ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 56.

²² C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam*, pp. 136-137.

colonial control.²³ Education was limited to the elites who would then be able to see through the German stimulated war propaganda and the ordinary people were not preoccupied with concepts such as pan-nationalism since their level of education was generally extremely low. In 1912 Tirtoadisoerjo stated: “Our motto must be, that the struggle for progress may not remain idle words. We Mohammedans also have the obligation to contribute our share, hence we decided to found Sarekat Islam.”²⁴ One of the goals for Sarekat Islam was to oppose the erroneous understanding of Islam and to promote religious life based on the customs and laws of Islam among the indigenous population.²⁵

Tjokroaminoto entered the politics as commissioner of Sarekat Islam. Here again, the Dutch report by the colonial civil administration provides us with firsthand knowledge of the context and there it is clear that Raden Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto worked as a trader-agent from Surabaya with Samanhoedi as one of his trade connections from Surakarta.²⁶ In Sarekat Islam Samanhoedi became president and Tjokroaminoto commissioner. From then on regular congresses of Sarekat Islam were held and people rallied quickly to the group. Interestingly, the impact of World War I in this development was limited. It was the internal political dynamics of Indonesian Islam that by then had begun to come into play. Snouck Hurgronje had already returned to the Netherlands, and from there he idealistically saw room for indigenous people and the Dutch settlers to be part of one society based on the ideas of the nationalist thinker Ernest Renan, provided that the Dutch showed tolerance to the indigenous people and that pan-Islamism was rejected.²⁷

The 1920s

What happened in the political field was however that in the 1920s Indonesia became increasingly subjected to various political influences that had also taken root in the early decades of the 20th century. The Tsar had been overthrown in Russia where the communist

²³ C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam*, p. XI.

²⁴ Quoted in J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 57.

²⁵ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, pp. 58-59.

²⁶ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 58.

²⁷ C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam*, p. 101.

movement took power in 1917. A peace agreement with Germany was concluded, but Germany still ended up losing World War I. As a result the Ottoman Empire was also decimated and the caliphate abolished. The Soviet Union however emerged as a force born out of World War I and communist influences quickly spread all over the world. The newly established Sarekat Islam organization saw a rift between national and socialist leaning elements already emerging clearly in the Second National Congress of 1917.²⁸ Here it is again important to take a step back and not overemphasize these political labels and ideologies. To the ordinary indigenous inhabitants of what later became Indonesians, the injustices they had experienced in the colonial Netherlands-Indies mattered. The emotions these injustices evoked could be appealed to and politicized by communism, nationalism and Islam, and these emotions could also be expressed in many different ways. Not all those labeled were actual militants of different ideologies. As the case of Prince Diponegoro showed in the 19th century, the political elites picked up these popular emotions and attempted to channel them. The Indonesian educated elites who began to emerge in the first half of the 20th century started out as a small interknit group, many of the members knew each other personally, and even held similar grievances against the colonial masters. The group was slowly torn apart through the international factors related to prevailing political currents of communism, Islam and nationalism as well as personal inner ambitions of leaders. This was the tightrope that most political groups, not only Sarekat Islam, had to walk when they vied for political support.

When confronted with this situation the Islamic leader Tjokroaminoto initially tried to maintain a balance between nationalists and communists in the board of Sarekat Islam.²⁹ On the same issue, in February 1920 Haji Agus Salim shared this personal view with Mohammad Hatta: “The Prophet Muhammad PBUH who was sent by God to develop Islam in the world already taught socialism 12 centuries before Marx. (...) the goal of a society based on equality (*sama rata sama rasa*) free of poverty, was already explained in Islam, the religion of God that the Prophet Muhammad brought to the world community.

²⁸ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 65.

²⁹ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 68.

Unfortunately, our religious scholars only focus on worship (ibadat) and jurisprudence (fikih), and forget the social (kemasyarakatan) aspect of Islam. (...) Tjokroaminoto has begun to remind the Muslim community of socialism in Islam. I will help him all that I can.”³⁰ This Indonesian attempt failed as foreign influence had been heavily curbing the possibility of local Indonesian success. The International Communist Organization *Komintern* intended to bring together all colonized indigenous people to gain international influence, and to include in its 1920 program a clear rejection of pan-Islamism.³¹ This effectively led to the Indonesian communist-leaning politicians being pushed out of the Sarekat Islam, as pan-Islamism was clearly opposed by communism.³² This imposition of Soviet Union policy created major difficulties for the left-wing Indonesians in Sarekat Islam.³³ In fact, later in the 1920s, Soekarno in his attempts to galvanize the indigenous movement against colonialism repeatedly tried to emphasize how there was no actual contradiction between communism and Islam by pointing to Islamists working together with communism in other colonized countries.³⁴

Snouck Hurgronje did not foresee that by the 1920s the political developments in Indonesia would have changed so remarkably with various indigenous political actors taking the stage. All of these would rely on different paths to political change for the underprivileged Indonesian colonized population. Nationalism was also widespread in the 1920s in Indonesia, and was clearly influenced by intellectual developments from abroad.³⁵ Despite the efforts of Indonesian national leaders to maintain unity, Sarekat Islam faced competition politically both from the Indonesian communists and the emerging nationalists. The sharp reaction against pan-Islamism by the Soviet Union, the

³⁰ Mohammad Hatta, *Untuk Negeriku, sebuah Otobiografi: Bukittingi-Rotterdam lewat Betawi* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2011), p. 116.

³¹ J.Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & zoon, 1935), p. 13.

³² J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 72.

³³ J.Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 18.

³⁴ See for instance the essay first published in *Suluh Indonesia Muda* in 1926 and reprinted in Soekarno, “Nationalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme” in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi* (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1963), pp. 1-22.

³⁵ See Frank Dhont, *Nationalism Baru Intellectual Tahun 1920-an* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2005).

Indonesian internal struggle for political influence and local resistance against the communists all produced the effect that the nationalist faction of Sarekat Islam was more drawn towards pan-Islamism as source of political strength. In an attempt to counter the nationalist Nationaal Indische Partij (National Indies Party) that created the national Al-Indië Congres (Whole Indies Congress) in the Netherlands-Indies, Sarekat Islam followed the example of the All Muslim League of British-India, and convened the first Al-Islam Congres [Whole (Indonesian) Islam Congress] in 1922.³⁶ Again, in the 1920s when Indonesian activists were finding their own identity to some extent, the struggle for power and political platform appeared.. The way these individual identities were created depended on many factors ranging from personal characteristics and political ideals, to national and international circumstances.

The goal of Sarekat Islam was to promote cooperation between all Muslims in matters of Islam and modernity. The Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal, was identified as a successful example of a political figure who had saved his country from destruction through urgently needed reform.³⁷ Almost as an afterthought at that time, an Islamic Council of Ulama (Islamic Scholars) was founded to handle religious affairs and to allow the leadership of Sarekat Islam to concentrate on political issues.³⁸ The reformist and socially active Muhammadiyah mass organization had been in existence since 1912, but had remained aloof from politics while Sarekat Islam was directly engaged in them. The official Sarekat Islam Party was finally established at the Sarekat Islam National Congress of 1923.

The main focus of the various national congresses of Sarekat Islam was Indonesian political matter, whereas the Al-Islam Congresses led by Sarekat Islam addressed the attitude of Indonesian Islam responding to international elements in the Islamic political realm. Islamic external influences in this process were largely basic cues taken from the examples of Muslims in British-India, who looked themselves at Turkey. Turkey was a major Islamic country where Islamic groups were also struggling to cope with the new

³⁶ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 77.

³⁷ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 77.

³⁸ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 77.

20th century era of modernity. The main topics at the second Al-Islam Congress held together with Muhammadiyah in May 1924 to set up Majelis Ulama (Council of Ulama) and to prioritize caliphate issue for Muslim unity.³⁹ In that year a final decision in the caliphate issue emerged, and the Indonesian Al-Islam Congress immediately responded to these developments.⁴⁰ The whole caliphate issue had been reported extensively in the Netherlands-Indies Press. In March 1924 the caliph was expelled from Turkey, and *De Sumatra Post* explained the course of this process to the local Indonesian reader as a chain of political decisions. Those began in 1922 and were protested in British-India by the Pan-Islamic Khilafat Movement (Indian Caliphate movement). The Khilafat Movement found the symbol of the caliph important and had raised objection to that the modern Turkish political leadership did not have any authority to abolish the position of caliph.⁴¹ The press informed the Indonesian readers that the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal countered this criticism by stating that the title caliph had no meaning, and therefore Pan-Islamism never genuinely functioned.⁴²

For Indonesian political Islam this internationally hot issue served as a way to identify their Muslim communities in the Netherlands-Indies, as supporters of Pan-Islamism, in a way that the communist-oriented former Sarekat Islam members could not support. The issue should also be regarded as an attempt to find external support in the Islamic world for the anti-colonial struggle of the Indonesians basically by rallying together with similar communities of colonial subjects such as the Indian Muslims. Various religious issues were originally discussed at the Al-Islam Congress of May 1924 in Indonesia but Tjokroaminoto mentioned that the Arab community in Indonesia had a plan to send people to a caliphate congress that would convene in Cairo in 1925.⁴³ The Al-Islam Congress of May 1924 was held at the moment when Indonesian political action began to actively seek

³⁹ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, pp. 82-83.

⁴⁰ For a more detailed account see Martin van Bruinessen, "Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question," *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1995, pp. 115-140.

⁴¹ *De Sumatra Post*, 05-04-1924, p. 2.

⁴² *De Sumatra Post*, 05-04-1924, p. 2.

⁴³ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, pp. 83-84.

out the international political scene, whereas in the years before international foreign factors were politically influencing Indonesian Islam without such response. The Sarekat Islam Party created a caliphate committee, and in December 1924 a special Al-Islam Congress was held where leaders from Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam discussed how they could participate in the caliphate convention in Cairo in 1925.⁴⁴ In Indonesia a consensus emerged to send an indigenous (non-Arab) delegation to Cairo, and it was thought that the caliphate should be in the hands of the Majelis Ulama in Mecca.⁴⁵ Where the Al-Islam Congress was therefore originally meant to deal with religious matters, these decisions clearly had taken on a very political international character.

International events in the Middle East however overtook the Indonesian developments, as even before the Indonesian delegation could leave for the congress in Cairo was postponed and finally cancelled.⁴⁶ A year later in 1926, a World Islamic Conference / Congress was convened in Mecca, and Sarekat Islam sent Tjokroaminoto with Muhammadiyah leader Mas Mansoer as Indonesian representatives.⁴⁷ Yet the Arab community in Indonesia and many orthodox Javanese Muslim Islamic scholars opposed these events because they did not see Ibn Saud as a religious ruler, besides, they regarded that Wahabism was dangerous to Indonesian Islam.⁴⁸ The Dutch colonial administrator Petrus-Blumberger who documented these events, determined this resistance as the cause for the founding of the traditionalist mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama in Surabaya in 1926. The foundation of Nahdlatul Ulama was labeled as the ‘Netherlands Indies branch of the World Islamic Conference / Congress’.⁴⁹

The Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party was clearly interested to gain political strength by joining forces with Muslims outside of the Netherlands-Indies and to take its political place in the Ummah (community of Muslims). The common identity of Islam provided

⁴⁴ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 84.

⁴⁵ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 85.

⁴⁶ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 85.

⁴⁷ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 88.

⁴⁸ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 89.

⁴⁹ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 89.

political links through Indonesian Islamic students and scholars visiting other parts of the Ummah where they could meet other Muslims who were politically active in their countries. Ironically these efforts led to the crystallization of resistance within Indonesian Islam, itself fearful of modern Wahabism in Saudi Arabia. This ended up fracturing the Indonesian Islamic community politically. The rivalry between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama dated from this era, and it has remained a major fault line in Indonesian politics today. That nationalism being involved in political movement and Islam in Indonesia being localized poorly caused the modernist Muslims to hold even tighter to the Pan-Islamism, as they thought that Islam was divine revelation which could not be violated, while nationalism as a man-made theory.⁵⁰ Nationalist leaders such as Soekarno argued that there was no reason for Islamists, nationalists and Marxists not to work together, as he gave the example of Indian nationalist Mahatma Ghandi who worked with the Pan-Islamists Maulana Mohammad Ali and Sjaikat Ali.⁵¹ However, in Indonesia the Sarekat Islam leader Tjokroaminoto ended up feuding with the important 1920s Indonesian nationalist leader Dr. Soetomo.⁵² Thus Muslim factions emerged in the Indonesian Ummah. The ideas of the modernist Islamic group were seen as too idealistic and ambitious, while in Java at the Nahdlatul Ulama Congress of 1928 a large number of Nahdlatul Ulama members turned against Wahabism and the modernists.⁵³ Saudi Arabian support for the international Islamic policies of Sarekat Islam collapsed in 1927 when Ibn Saud showed no longer interested in the World Islamic Congress.⁵⁴ Sarekat Islam and Islamic communities from other nations were forced to try to find alternative forms of cooperation.

The 1930s

⁵⁰ M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, p. 239.

⁵¹ Soekarno, "Nationalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme" in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, p. 5.

⁵² J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 312.

⁵³ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 324.

⁵⁴ J. Th. Petrus-Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 318.

Political Islam represented in the Sarekat Islam Party had attempted to seek support from the Middle East, however this ended in a further splintering of the Indonesian Muslim Ummah in the Netherlands-Indies. Rejection by the traditional Islamic segment of Indonesian Ulama to the international policy of modernist Muslims had fractured Indonesian Islamic political power nationally. Sarekat Islam had even created a major disruption with the nationalist segment of Indonesian political activists in opposing Dutch colonialism. Communists were also at odds with Islamists because of the policies in the 1920s, and this left the totality of the combined Indonesian national movement to constitute any sort of opposing power to the Dutch colonial government.

Appealing to Pan-Islamist sentiment as a channel for popular support did continue, but never yielded any significant success. It seemed that Snouck Hurgronje was right after all in his skepticism toward Pan-Islamism. Indonesians tried to rally local Muslim support based on Pan-Islamic solidarity in several occasions, for example when in 1931 the Italian colonial power in Libya executed Libyan hero Omar al-Mukhtar. The event was of fortunate political timing as it also coincided with the 1931 World Islamic Congress. However in Indonesia contrary to what had happened only a few years prior, in 1931 these new political developments in the Middle East were not acted upon by Islamic Indonesian politicians and only the Indonesian student Abdul Kahar Muzakir acted alone as Indonesian international representative.⁵⁵ The actual events in Libya, with the execution of Omar Al-Mukhtar, were also found without appeal as a motivational force for Islamic anti-colonial militancy in Indonesia.⁵⁶ In short, for the ordinary Muslims in the Netherlands-Indies, awareness of international political situations was not just that self-evident in a society of limited literacy and colonial government's censoring any news potentially, that endangered its authority. Indonesian people who went abroad and had international contact with the Middle East Muslims were students and pilgrims. These

⁵⁵ Frank Dhont, "The Historical figure of Omar Al-Mukhtar and Islamic Martyrdom in Indonesia," *Al-Jamiah Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2012, pp. 89-90.

⁵⁶ For one such case see Frank Dhont, "The Historical figure of Omar Al-Mukhtar and Islamic Martyrdom in Indonesia," pp. 75-96.

people came back with the knowledge of what was going on in the Middle East, and they became aware how to rally Indonesians to the cause of Islam as well as nationalism. This reflected the failure of Pan-Islamism.

Although Minangkabau students in Cairo witnessed the failure of the caliphate conference, however, they began to think beyond Pan-Islamism.⁵⁷ As a result new political ideas emerged in Sumatra when these Muslim students returned home in the 1930s. In Sumatra, there had long been important intellectual Islamic traditions; however, Sumatra was very remote and limited in importance comparing with Java that had been the center of politics with great population in the Netherlands-Indies. Politically it took time for appeal to spread beyond local Muslim groups in Sumatra. Sumatrans were indeed active in political Islam and they had most impact when operating in the Java-based framework. The Minangkabau activist Mas Mansoer, who had studied in Egypt and was also active in the nationalist group of Dr. Soetomo, formed the Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia (The High Islamic Council of Indonesia) in 1937 attempting to unify various Islamic groups with the support from Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. The group intended to make use of Islam to unify Indonesians via political means, and this aim was achieved at the end.⁵⁸ There was a huge number of politically active people to project Muslim strength especially while comparing to those active in the nationalist movement. In 1939, Muhammadiyah had approximately 100,000 active members, while the prominent nationalist Parindra group had only 3,500 in 1936-37.⁵⁹ The comparison is of course flawed as Muhammadiyah was not politically active, but the difference in numbers did reflect the influence of Islam that continued to motivate people into action. These groups clearly maintained and nourished extensive international networking contacts in the late 1930s. As the leader of Parindra, in 1936, Soetomo went for an international study tour

⁵⁷ M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, p. 239.

⁵⁸ M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, pp. 241-242.

⁵⁹ Jan Pluvier, *De Indonesische Nationalistische Beweging* (Den Haag: Van Hoeve, 1953), p. 198.

promoting Islamic teachings and education. He visited various universities and students in India, Turkey, the Netherlands, and England.⁶⁰

The Transitional Decade of the 1940s and the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945)

Major change in the Indonesian politics took place in the 1940s. The Second World War was another foreign influence that meddled with the potential of Indonesian Islam as a political force. The Japanese noticed the political development of Islam in Indonesia, and decided to use this for their advantage in the years of their occupying Indonesia. The era after the Japanese occupation was immediately followed by a new era of struggle against the Dutch who were making efforts to recapture their former colony. The Netherlands finally acknowledged defeat when the Dutch Queen Juliana signed an official document to recognize Indonesian sovereignty on 27 December 1949, almost 4 years after the independence was declared by Indonesian President Soekarno on 17 August 1945. In the struggle between Indonesians and the colonial authority, the arrival of the Japanese in 1942 and the occupation of the Netherlands Indies marked three painful and long years of suffering. However, the political situation for Indonesian Islam fundamentally changed due to specific Japanese policies toward Islam.

Use of Propaganda

Japanese's attitude towards Islam can be summarized as readily making use of Islamic militancy for Japanese war aims. Japan realized that propaganda could not move ordinary Indonesian people, but the *Kyai*⁶¹ (local Javanese Ulama) could, and the Japanese

⁶⁰ Imam Supardi, *Dr. Soetomo: Riwayat Hidup dan Perjuangannya* (Jakarta-Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1951), p. 58.

⁶¹ Most academic sources use the term *Kyai* and not *Ulama* probably to emphasize the social element of Islamic political power in stead of scholarly prowess in Islam. One figure could easily have both social political power and profound scholarly knowledge in Islamic jurisprudence.

tried to make use of these people.⁶² As soon as Indonesia was captured in 1942, the Japanese created the “Kantor Urusan Agama” or “Shumubu” (Religious Affairs Office) in which Japanese Muslims were appointed as prominent staff members.⁶³ The Japanese selected various Kyai in Java and gave them several weeks of training in Jakarta.⁶⁴ Various measures attempting to demonstrate Japanese respect for Islam were introduced such as regulations that Japanese had to remove shoes before entering mosques. More significantly that the Majelis Islam A’la Indonesia (MIAI) was one of the very few pre-war organizations allowed to remain operational since the very beginning of Japanese rule.⁶⁵ The Japanese however proceeded to make use of this organization, and implemented a Kyai training course held in the MIAI from 1943.⁶⁶ This indicates that the Japanese must have been sufficiently certain that the MIAI would meet those pro-Japanese purposes considered prominent. It is important to emphasize that during the Japanese era political agency in Indonesia had almost totally become subservient to the needs and goals of the foreign power. The Japanese era was so restrictive that it made the Dutch colonial authority look relatively benign as indigenous organizations benefitted from much more freedom than the situation during the Japanese occupation. The MIAI was the exception to the rule as all other political organizations before the Japanese arrival were forced to disband.

Japanese’s use of Islam and the MIAI being delegitimized the political movements to a certain extent led to the nationalist political actors being forced to work with the Japanese authority. A war was fought, and the MIAI could not seriously go against the demands of the Japanese military government in any way. Even the slightest verbal protest or resistance was dangerous. The Islamic political organization was basically reduced to a tool for Japanese propaganda training of the Kyai. In 1943 Japan tightened its control over

⁶² I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting: Gegevens en documenten over de Jaren 1942-1945* (Franeker: T. Wever, 1960), p. 537.

⁶³ I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 537.

⁶⁴ I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 538.

⁶⁵ I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 538.

⁶⁶ I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 538.

the Indonesian society even further, and the nominally independent Indonesian founded MIAI was replaced with a Japanese constructed group called Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims).⁶⁷ This further erased the last semblance of independent indigenous Indonesian Muslims' political agency.

Mobilization of the Muslim Masses

It was blatantly obvious that Japan was to use the potential of Islam to mobilize for her own political purpose. The result of this engagement with Indonesian political Islam however revealed the fact that Islam was genuinely a political power of national prominence, and it also created a new group of national Muslim leaders effectively reducing the influence of the pre-war groups such as Sarekat Islam.⁶⁸ The Japanese were nevertheless careful not to give political Islam too much effect initially. The Shumubu was then under the authority of Hussein Djajadiningrat who was in charge of a two-pronged department: one section handled research, publication of Islamic works and performed Kyai training, the other section supervised civil servants, Kyai and the whole Indonesian Islamic movement including the MIAI.⁶⁹ Djajadiningrat was indeed a respected civil servant who had already been active in civil service during the Dutch period, but he clearly was not Ulama nor Kyai, and was generally regarded not being concerned with the actual interests of Muslims.⁷⁰ It stands to reason that Japan would take the initiation to retain control over Muslim political power by not appointing any leader who would turn the masses against her authority. For the purposes of Japanese propaganda, leaders such as Muhammadiyah's Mas Mansoer were asked to call upon the unification of Islamic organizations and Muslims to support the Japanese efforts in war.⁷¹ In 1944 the Japanese removed Djajadiningrat from the position, and replaced with the highly respected aged

⁶⁷ I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 539.

⁶⁸ Remy Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Masyumi Party between Democracy and Integralism* (Singapore: NUS press, 2015), p. 59.

⁶⁹ I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 538.

⁷⁰ R. De Bruin, *Islam en Nationalisme in door Japans bezet Indonesië 1942-1945* (Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 1982), p. 76.

⁷¹ R. De Bruin, *Islam en Nationalisme in door Japans bezet Indonesië 1942-1945*, p. 79.

Islamic leader Hasyim Asy'ari who acted simply as a nominal head of the Masyumi.⁷² Hasyim Asy'ari, the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama, was put in charge, while his son Wahid Hasyim and Abdul Kahar Muzakir ran the daily management of the Shumubu.⁷³ Japanese remained in control, and contrary to the Dutch colonialism 'Indonesian' organizations and conferences held during the Japanese period provided very little information about genuine Indonesian ideas and political thought at that time. They were merely the expression of the Japanese influence behind these various Indonesian actors. A case in point perhaps was the Japanese propaganda reports in which Mas Mansoer in a MIAI meeting in December 1942 joined other leaders in praising Japan by indicating how Muslims were prepared to make sacrifices comparing the war situation to that of Abraham when prepared to sacrifice his son.⁷⁴ The Islamic leadership had little choice but to pay lip service to the Japanese war aims as Japan drove prominent figures of Islamic organizations around. The fact of the matter was that during the occupation Japanese authority forced Muslims to bow to the emperor, used the mosques for their own propaganda activities, and censored the Friday prayer or simply forbade it at times.⁷⁵

Indonesian Muslim Responses

Before the war political Islam welcomed support and leadership from strong external political groups, while the heavy handed, manipulative Japanese were not the kind of external 'support' hoped for. There was nonetheless benefit to be found in the Japanese arrival. The Japanese had begun to provide some military training to Muslim youth in Indonesia. At the end of 1944 a small militia group called Hizbullah (Party of God) was founded, and later another group called Sabilillah (God's Path) was also brought into military training.⁷⁶ In fact, during the formation of the nationalist auxiliary army, Pembela

⁷² I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 539.

⁷³ Faisal Ismail, "The Nahdlatul Ulama: Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of the Indonesian State," *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2011, p. 270.

⁷⁴ I. J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 542.

⁷⁵ Howard M. Federspiel, *Sultans, Shamans and Saints: Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), p. 124.

⁷⁶ Faisal Ismail, "The Nahdlatul Ulama: Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of the Indonesian State," p. 270.

Tanah Air (Homeland Defenders), and within its leadership, several Islam inspired leaders occupied prominent positions. Kasman Singodimedjo, a prominent local member of Muhammadiyah for instance, was in charge of the Batavia (Jakarta) Battalion.⁷⁷ The training of the Hizbullah and Sabilillah allowed the rapid rise of militant Islamic fighters in the political vacuum that occurred right after the Japanese defeat in August 1945. The Japanese period therefore formed a peculiar stage in the evolution of Indonesian political Islam. Japan manipulated Indonesian Islam during the war years, but also opened up the door for opportunities that strengthened Islam in the years of Revolution and beyond. Japan delegitimized the Indonesian Islamic leaders in the sense that they had to do the bidding of the Japanese and had very little say on the matter, but Japan also empowered Indonesian political Islam by constructing a new Islamic political group that was now prominent on the national Indonesian stage. Harry Benda is credited for pointing out how Islam was used by the Japanese.⁷⁸ The fact that the Japanese only began to train Islamic militia more than one full year after the Pembela Tanah Air does show how cautious they were in dealing with political Islamic militancy.

They were wise to be cautious as the Indonesian Muslims became increasingly disenchanted with Japanese propaganda and promises. In February 1944 the incident in Tasikmalaya where Kyai Haji Zainal Mustafa and his pesantren (Islamic boarding school) decided to resist Japanese intrusion was a clear warning to the Japanese authority not to take Indonesian Islamic leaders for granted.⁷⁹ The incident itself was quite minor with only a few Japanese being killed, yet it was a shock for the Japanese in Java to realize that the Muslim masses could easily turn against them.

Between Acceptance and Resentment

⁷⁷ R. De Bruin, *Islam en Nationalisme in door Japans bezet Indonesië 1942-1945*, p. 78.

⁷⁸ See Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958).

⁷⁹ See Aiko Inomata Kurasawa, "Mobilization and Control: A Study of Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945," (PhD thesis, University of Cornell, 1988), pp. 628-634.

The full extent of the influence of Japanese occupation on Indonesian Islam is hard to measure, but the significant impact of the Japanese was that they equipped Indonesian Muslims with militancy, this never happened before. Education of the indigenous people was not greatly improved during the war, but the Islamic politically inspired youth did receive some military training. This for the first time harnessed Islamic youth in groups based purely on their religious affiliation. Such a policy created the awareness for ordinary Muslims to become more active and concerned with the events outside their living place. The forced mobilization by the Japanese organized the Indonesians more actively involved in society. During the Japanese occupation the Muslim political elites were just as all other Indonesian leaders forced to cooperate with the Japanese. This harsh experience of direct domination by an outside power probably contributed at least for some people to a greater ability and willingness to compromise after the war ended.

After the defeat of the Japanese a chaotic situation emerged as various groups came to jostle for political power. Communists' political power reemerged from years of hiding during the Dutch and the Japanese rule. The general population still had only very limited education in politics, but had been subjected to the atrocities and burdens of war. Many of the masses clung to what they saw as their most important identity marker, and that was Islam. Ironically Masyumi never held any civil administration power except that in the religious realm.⁸⁰ The secular nationalist political leaders took the political lead and attempted to rebuild the broader coalition of various political groups, and they partially succeeded. A large section of the Indonesian Islamic political militants were willing to compromise with the nationalists. The Muslim elites did try to negotiate for special status for the sake of Islam in the constitution, but this never materialized.

Politically the Indonesian nationalists emerged as the dominant faction when a coalition was set up among various Islamic groups, secular nationalists, and communists, even the Yogyakarta branch of the Mataram royal family. Sukarno and Hatta became president and vice-president of the new Indonesian Republic. Some of the Islamic groups

⁸⁰ R. De Bruin, *Islam en Nationalisme in door Japans bezet Indonesië 1942-1945*, p. 97.

and leaders, who were not included, could not come to terms with the political compromise. Relying on their Japanese military training, the Darul Islam (House of Islam) group, took up arms in struggle for political power and the creation of the Islamic state of Indonesia. Not all Islamic militants turned to anti-government violence. Some of the Islamic militia became part of the National Army that grew out of the Japanese trained Pembela Tanah Air army. It took the newly formed Indonesian Republic many years of struggle before all these rebels were defeated. In areas such as Aceh, this struggle took even longer.

After the Japanese Defeat of 1945

Very limited outside influence seems to have been directed at Indonesian political Islamic organizations when the world entered the era of decolonization. The pre-war networks that the Indonesian political groups built up especially in the Islamic world guaranteed empathy for the Indonesian cause against the Dutch colonial authority that was trying to reclaim its colony. The countries of the Non-aligned Movement worked with the Indonesian nationalist leadership, subsequently denying support to Islamic groups that were now labeled rebel factions. Neighboring countries such as the British colony that later formed Malaysia had their own problems of immigration and rebellion to deal with. Indonesia decided to channel the power of Islam, but this happened in a wave of anti-colonialism that engulfed the world. Their Muslim counterparts, Egypt and Afghanistan recognized Indonesia in the 1940s, and each sent representatives to Yogyakarta where the seat of the Indonesian government was then located.⁸¹ Internationally the formal independent Indonesian government was finally recognized in 1950 by the world, and Ahmad Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo was sent to Egypt in 1952.⁸² At that time King Farouk was replaced by the revolutionary military when in 1954 Nasser took over power. The international political climate clearly favored nationalist governments all over the world, who were dealing with their own internal problems. Foreign political impact on Indonesian Islam became minor in years after the end of World War II, because the Indonesian

⁸¹ Ahmad Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, *Kesadaran Nasional: Otobiografi* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1978), pp. 443-444.

⁸² Ahmad Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, *Kesadaran Nasional*, p. 444.

nationalist government was seen as a legitimate counterpart to the other Muslim nations. The Indonesian nationalist government had also accommodated Muslim politicians as well as Indonesian communist politicians to a degree and could claim this national legitimacy.

After World War II the ministry of religious affairs was established to handle Muslim affairs like the way the Sarekat Islam and other groups wanted a ministry to settle these matters in the early decades of the 20th century. Indonesia also began to invest with great efforts in education for the masses. The modern state that had been the dream of the nationalist movement gradually came into existence. The Masyumi founded by Japanese continued to exist as a vehicle for Islamic political power, and its name was perhaps reused by Indonesians after the war because it allowed easier access to the network of Masyumi branches.⁸³ Nahdlatul Ulama also continued to work with the nationalists to build the Indonesian Republic, and this compromise helped Nahdlatul Ulama increase its political prominence after the end of the war.⁸⁴ Nahdlatul Ulama and Masyumi would however increasingly come to hold opposing views, resulting in Nahdlatul Ulama's leaving Masyumi in 1952. The balance of power shown in the 1955 election, reflected a fairly even distribution between the secular nationalists, Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, and the Indonesian Communist Party. Contrary to Nahdlatul Ulama with strong support in Central and East Java, Masyumi's support came from the outer islands specifically central and southern Sumatra and southern Sulawesi.⁸⁵ Islam had by now matured into an important political power as well as an intrinsic element of Indonesian identity and political life. The role of interaction between Indonesian Islam and the outside world Muslims or otherwise was now fulfilled by the Indonesian state as legitimate representative of the Indonesian people. This Indonesian state subsequently began to impose its own policy on political Islam when conflicts arose. When several Masyumi members supported anti-Soekarno rebellions, Masyumi was banned by President Soekarno in 1960. Masyumi was also not

⁸³ Remy Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 59.

⁸⁴ Faisal Ismail, "The Nahdlatul Ulama: Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of the Indonesian State," p. 273.

⁸⁵ Remy Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 211.

regenerated when Suharto took over six years later. During the second half of the 20th century, Middle Eastern influence on Indonesian Islam would again grow, but the independence of Indonesia and the nationalist indigenous flavor of Indonesian Islam continued to provide the impetus for national Islamic political development driven primarily by Indonesian internal requirements with only limited space for and importance granted to outside influences.

Conclusion


The study of the development of Islam in Indonesia in the first half of the 20th century demonstrates a constant interaction between foreign influences and the domestic Indonesian Islamic political movement. The important conclusion this paper draws is that historically the decision making in seeking international political Islamic support was largely driven by an internal process in Indonesia based on the balance of power between Indonesian political groups' interest. The communist Soviet policies clearly opened up a wedge in the Indonesian Islamic movement early on. The issue of Pan-Islamism caused another rift in the Indonesian Islamic movement, and the Japanese occupation trained and armed some Islamic militants who would rebel against the Indonesian national government after the war. The large part of the Indonesian Islamic movement compromised with the other political movements in Indonesia to become part of the Republic. Indonesians based their political decisions on an internal political decision making process of domestic expediency that took precedent over the interests of these external influences. Even when Japan oppressed the autonomy of the Indonesian political movement, Indonesian political power re-established itself after the Japanese defeat.

In the beginning of the 20th century politically active Indonesians inspired by Islam took the initiative to go and study abroad where they were inspired by the ideas of their

foreign counterparts who likewise engaged in anti-colonial struggle. The Islamic political leaders constantly managed to appeal to the broad masses of Muslim and looked to the Middle East for outside support. The Middle East however failed to support Indonesians' subscribing to Pan-Islamism. During the first half of the 20th century the idea of Pan-Islamism did not become a workable model for Indonesian political Islam. On the contrary, the focus of the modernist Islamic groups in Saudi Arabia caused a fracture in Indonesian Islam that remains visible until today with both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama appealing to the Indonesian Muslims. The political aspirations of individual Islamic leaders and politicians as well as the aspirations of national political factions were paramount to the development of Indonesian Islam. The outside influence from the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and even Japan were factors in the sense that they provided an international framework for Islamic political inspiration. The primary agency was held by the Indonesian decision makers themselves, intending on modernization of their nation and aspiring towards Indonesian independence.

When the Japanese invaded Indonesia, they cautiously attempted to mobilize Islam. The Japanese compromised with the mass appeal of political Islam, and tried to exploit it to strengthen Japan's self-position during World War II. In doing so, the Japanese for the first time infused militancy into the Islamic political groups. The use of Islam for propaganda also led to an increased Islamic political awareness. After the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, this provided a political opportunity for Indonesian Islam to assert itself in the Republic. The militarization of Indonesian political Islam as a power however also caused major negative tensions when various Indonesian Islamic groups rebelled against the Republican Indonesian government.

After the independence, Indonesian Islam fractured again when those Islamic political groups followed different political strategies. The most successful Islamic political strategy was to form an alliance with the Indonesian nationalists. This provided a degree of political balance and national stability that continues to be perceivable in Indonesia today. Indonesian Islam now has less need for guidance from abroad, and is

politically more self-confident and reliant. Foreign influences vying for populist appeal in Indonesia are in fact largely mitigated and countered by general state mentorship through education with the support of the broader Islamic institutions such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama originally founded by Indonesian Islamic politicians during the colonial period of first half of the 20th century. 

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（責任編輯：毛帝勝、余承勸、張偉恩、楊雅蓉、鄒武霖、羅正揚）